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ARE WE HEADING TOWARD A CHARTER SCHOOL
"BUBBLE"?: LESSONS FROM THE SUBPRIME
MORTGAGE CRISIS
Preston C. Green III*
Bruce D. Baker **
Joseph 0. Oluwole
Julie F. Mead ****
INTRODUCTION
Since 1992, forty-three states and the District of Columbia
have passed charter school legislation.1 Charter schools are com-
monly defined as public schools that are given considerable lati-
tude from state rules and regulations that apply to traditional
public schools while being held accountable for student achieve-
ment.2 There are more than 6700 charter schools nationwide,
serving nearly three million students, which accounts for 6% of
public school enrollment.3
Charter school advocates have called for the removal of obsta-
cles that limit their expansion, such as the lack of charter school
authorizer options and caps on the number of charter schools al-
lowed within a state.4 The federal government has also sought to
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1. SARA MEAD ET AL., BELLWETHER EDUC. PARTNERS, THE STATE OF THE CHARTER
SCHOOL MOVEMENT 37 (2015), http://bellwethereducation.org/sites/default/files/Charter
%20Research%200908%20FINAL.pdf; Adam Weinberg, Moms Say Kids Can't Wait for
Better Schools, PLATTE INST. FOR ECON. RES. (July 9, 2015), http://www.platteinstitute.org
/researchldetail/moms-say-nebraskas-kids-cant-wait-for-better-schools.
2. What Are Public Charter Schools?, NAT'L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SC-S.,
http://www.publiccharters.org/get-the-facts/public-charter-schools/.
3. MEAD ET AL., supra note 1, at 3.
4. See, e.g., CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, CHARTER SCHOOL LAWS ACROSS THE STARES:
2015 RANKINGS AND SCORECARD 6-7 (Alison Consoletti Zgainer & Kara Kerwin eds.,
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increase charter school growth through financial incentive pro-
grams like Race to the Top, which authorized the U.S. Depart-
ment of Education to expand support for high-performing charter
schools.'
However, charter schools have also been plagued by scandal,
both in terms of financial management and with respect to stu-
dent discipline. For instance, two governmental watchdog groups
claimed to have uncovered $200 million in charter school fraud,
abuse, and mismanagement in fifteen states.6 And a report of the
disciplinary practices of Chicago schools revealed that charter
schools expelled 61 of every 10,000 students, while district-run
schools expelled only 5 out of every 10,000 students.7
Mark Naison, a professor of African American Studies and His-
tory at Fordham University, has claimed that the charter school
scandals are beginning to resemble the subprime mortgage cri-
sis.' Subprime mortgages were loans offered by financial institu-
tions to persons whose financial standing was too weak to qualify
2015), http://www.illinoispolicy.org/reports/why-arent-there-more-charter-schools-in-illin
ois/ (finding a high number of independent authorizers in the five states with the most fa-
vorable charter school laws); ELIZABETH G. HILL, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE,
ASSESSING CALIFORNIA'S CHARTER SCHOOLS 35-36 (2004), www.lao.ca.gov/2004/charter-
schools/012 004 charter schools.pdf (recommending that the California legislature remove
the cap on the number of charter schools in the state in order to improve charter school
funding and oversight); PENNCAN, EXPAND HIGH-QUALITY CHOICES FOR FAMILIES: REFORM
PENNSYLVANIA'S CHARTER SCHOOL LAW 4, 10 (2012), http://www.penncan.org/sites/penn
can.orgtfiles/PennCAN-Charter-School-Issue-Brief%/o2O.pdf ( iscussing the benefits of per-
mitting multiple authorizers in a state); Collin Hitt, Why Aren't There More Charter
Schools in Illinois?, ILL. POLY INST. (Jan. 31, 2008), https://www.illinoispolicy.orglreports/
why-arent-there-more-charter-schools-in-illinois/ (concluding that charter school supply
can increase by reducing charter school caps and allowing "multiple authorizers to issue
charters and monitor those charter schools after they open").
5. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., States Open to Charters Start Fast in 'Race to
Top': Education Secretary Seeking Autonomy with Real Accountability for School Innova-
tors (June 8, 2009), www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/states-open-charters-start-fast-race-
top.
6. CTR. FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY & ALL. TO RECLAIM OUR SCHS., THE TIP OF THE
ICEBERG: CHARTER SCHOOL VULNERABILITY TO WASTE, FRAUD, AND ABUSE: ESCALATING
FRAUD WARRANTS IMMEDIATE FEDERAL AND STATE ACTION TO PROTECT PUBLIC DOLLARS
AND PREVENT FINANCIAL MISMANAGEMENT 1, 4-5 (2015), http://populardemocracy.org/
sites/default/files/Charter-Schools-National-Report rev2.pdf.
7. Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah & Alex Richards, CPS: Expulsion Rate Higher at Charter
Schools, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 26, 2014), http://articles.chicagotribune.conm20l4-02-26/news/ct-
chicago-schools-discipline-met-20140226_ 1charter-schools-andrew-broy-district-run-
schools.
8. Mark Naison, Why Charter School Scandals Resemble the Subprime Mortgage




for a typical mortgage at the prevailing interest rate.9 To protect
lenders, these mortgages were issued at much higher interest
rates, with foreclosure as the penalty of default."' Despite the risk
to subprime borrowers, the federal government sought to increase
homeownership among the working class and minorities by en-
couraging subprime lending.' As a result, private lenders oppor-
tunistically entered into the subprime mortgage market in ear-
nest.'2 Their aggressive lending practices created a housing
bubble in which the value of residential real estate rose to artifi-
cially high and unsustainable levels.3 This bubble burst and
home values plummeted when subprime borrowers were unable
to keep up with their mortgages.'4 Not only did the housing bub-
ble cause the virtual collapse of the housing industry, but it also
contributed to a worldwide recession.15
With respect to charter schools, Naison asserted that, similar
to the subprime mortgage situation, the federal government en-
couraged the charter school sector to expand with little oversight.
As a consequence, Naison explained that charter schools are ex-
periencing abusive practices at a level resembling the subprime
mortgage crisis." These abuses have taken on two forms: (1) mis-
treatment of students and teachers (e.g., the refusal to educate
special needs students and English language learners); and (2) fi-
nancial issues, such as embezzlement and real estate fraud.7
In this article, we explain how Mark Naison may be correct in
asserting that charter schools are developing conditions that are
reminiscent of the subprime mortgage crisis. Part I explains how
the federal government helped to create the subprime mortgage
crisis by creating an alternate mortgage origination structure-
i.e., the "originate-to-distribute" ("OTD") model-that increased







15. Id.; see also Joel Havemann, The Financial Crisis of 2008: Year in Review 2008,
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.comltopic/Financial-Crisis-of-2008-The
-1484264 (last visited Feb. 19, 2016) (noting that Germany, Japan, and China were caught
in a recession in 2008 after the American housing market crashed).
16. Naison, supra note 8.
17. Id.
2016]
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gage lenders. While OTD mortgage origination enabled mortgage
originators to increase the number of mortgages, it also removed
the incentive for originators to engage in screening, which in turn
led to excessive foreclosures. This section then explains how the
adoption of multiple authorizers might create similar conditions
in the charter school sector.
Part II explains how the OTD model created a principal-agent
problem between mortgage investors and mortgage servicers. On
the one hand, mortgage investors (principal) wished to maximize
the value of loans that were in danger of foreclosure. On the other
hand, mortgage servicers (agent) had the incentive to engage in
automated default administration, which led to excessive foreclo-
sures, instead of more expensive hands-on loss mitigation. This
section then discusses how a similar principal-agent problem be-
tween charter school boards (principal) and education manage-
ment organizations ("EMOs") (agent) incentivizes EMOs to cut
corners with regards to the servicing of charter schools.
Part III examines the predatory practices associated with the
subprime mortgage crisis. As the profitability of these loans
soared, various mortgage servicers used questionable practices to
lure vulnerable populations to take out loans that were not in
their best interests. The section then discusses instances when
charter schools have likewise been accused of predatory practices
in order to boost enrollment.
Part IV explains what a "bubble" might look like in the charter
school sector. Employing the policy bubble framework of Moshe
Maor, s we explain how the combination of multiple authorizers
and EMOs might work together to create an abundance of poor
performing schools in urban African American communities. We
also discuss the process by which such a bubble might actually
burst, creating disarray in these communities. The final section,
Part V, discusses the steps that federal and state governments
should take to avoid the creation of a policy bubble in these vul-
nerable neighborhoods.
18. Moshe Maor, Policy Bubbles: Policy Overreaction and Positive Feedback, 27
GOVERNANCE: AN INT'L J. POL'Y, ADMIN. & INSTITUTIONS 469, 471-73 (2014).
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I. GRANTING STRUCTURES THAT INCREASE PARTICIPATION, WHILE
LESSENING SCREENING STANDARDS
A. Subprime Mortgages
Under the traditional originate-to-hold model of mortgage orig-
ination, banks and savings and loan associations ("S&Ls") origi-
nated and serviced the loans that they held in their portfolios.9
Because of the risk of default on the part of borrowers, they lent
only to "prime borrowers," who posed little risk of default, instead
of "subprime borrowers" with less-than-perfect credit.2" The origi-
nate-to-hold model prevented the expansion of homeownership by
not only limiting mortgage origination, but also restricting the
development of a secondary mortgage market, where mortgage
loans were bought and sold.2"
In the 1970s, the federal government sponsored enterprises
("GSEs") engaged in housing-the Federal National Mortgage As-
sociation ("Freddie Mac") and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Association ("Fannie Mae")-sought to increase homeownership
by adopting the OTD model of mortgage origination.22 Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac purchased mortgages from participating lending
institutions, pooled these mortgages together, and then converted
the loans into more liquid and flexible instruments.23 The mort-
gage originators who had sold their mortgages to the GSEs made
money from the fees generated from the sale.2" Mortgage origina-
tors could also issue more mortgages because the GSEs offered
guarantees against mortgage default." During this period, pri-
19. JAMES R. BARTH, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE U.S. MORTGAGE AND CREDIT
MARKETS: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET MELTDOWN 23 (2009).
20. Janice Kay McClendon, The Perfect Storm: How Mortgage-Backed Securities, Fed-
eral Deregulation, and Corporate Greed Provide a Wake-up Call for Reforming Executive
Compensation, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 131, 140 (2009).
21. See id. at 139-40.
22. See Peter M. Carrozzo, Marketing the American Mortgage: The Emergency Home
Finance Act of 1970, Standardization and the Secondary Market Revolution, 39 REAL
PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 765, 800 (2005); see also Richard J. Rosen, The Impact of the Origi-
nate-to-Distribute Model on Banks Before and During the Financial Crisis (2011),
http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1719612.
23. See Carrozzo, supra note 22, at 800.
24. See Sumit Agarwal et al., Adverse Selection in Mortgage Securitization, FDIC
(2008), https://www.fdic.gov/banklanalytical/cfr/mortgage-future house finance/papers
Chang.PDF (explaining that originators trade conforming mortgage pools to GSEs for se-
curities backed by the mortgage pools or sometimes sell the mortgages for cash).
25. See id. at 4.
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vate financial institutions also began engaging in mortgage secu-
ritization in which they originated loans, collected the fees, and
then sold the mortgages to investors.26 Thus, these originators
were free to issue more mortgages because they had passed the
default risk to investors.27
Beginning in the 1980s, the federal government also sought to
encourage homeownership by deregulating the financial industry
so that it too could increase its involvement in mortgage securiti-
zation.28 The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980 encouraged subprime lending by easing inter-
est rate restrictions, preempting state usury laws, and allowing
for higher loan-to-value ratios, i.e., the ratio of the mortgage loan
to the value of the property.9 The Alternative Mortgage Transac-
tion Parity Act of 1982 preempted state laws that prohibited
banks from originating mortgages except conventional fixed-rate
mortgages.3" Banks were allowed to issue adjustable-rate mort-
gages, balloon-payment mortgages, and interest-only mortgages,
which were the hallmarks of subprime mortgages.31 The Second-
ary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984 encouraged pri-
vate mortgage securitization by declaring private mortgage-
backed securities equivalent to those created by federal agencies,
including GSEs.32 Finally, the Financial Services Modernization
Act of 1999 permitted banks, security firms, and insurance com-
panies to merge into large conglomerates, thus increasing their
capacity to engage in mortgage securitization.2
In the 1990s, the federal government further promoted private
participation in securitization by setting fair housing goals for the
26. Carrozzo, supra note 22, at 801.
27. Agarwal et al., supra note 24, at 4.
28. See McClendon, supra note 20, at 143.
29. Id. at 143-44 (citing Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.)); see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE HOUSING FINANCE SYSTEM AND FEDERAL
POLICY: RECENT CHANGES AND OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 86 (1983).
30. McClendon, supra note 20, at 144 (citing Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity
Act of 1982, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3801-06 (2006)).
31. See id. (identifying various mortgages stemming from the Alternative Mortgage
Transaction Parity Act of 1982).
32. See id. (citing Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-440, 98 Stat. 1689 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15
U.S.C.)).
33. Id. at 144-45 (citing Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No.




GSEs to increase homeownership among disadvantaged groups.
For instance, the Housing and Community Development Act of
1992 changed the mission of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to
"service the mortgage finance needs of low-and-moderate-income
persons, racial minorities and inner-city residents."34 Originally,
the legislation required 30% of GSE purchases to be related to af-
fordable housing.35 During the Clinton Administration, the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") increased
the quota to 50%."' In 2005, HUD increased the affordable hous-
ing goals for the next four years from 50% to 56%.37
Although the Housing and Community Development Act did
not specifically call for GSEs to become involved in the subprime
market, the targets set by HUD forced the GSEs to lower under-
writing standards.38 In late 1994, after HUD announced its af-
fordable housing goal for 1996, the GSEs reduced their down
payment requirements to 3%.39 In 2000, after HUD raised the af-
fordable housing goals to 50%, the GSEs required no down pay-
ments for its mortgages.°
The federal government's promotion of the OTD mortgage orig-
ination model led to a dramatic increase in homeownership. Be-
tween 1995 and 2004, homeownership rose from 64%-where it
had been for thirty-five years-to around 69%.4' The adoption of
the OTD model also led to an increase in subprime loan origina-
tions. In 2002, $200 billion in subprime mortgages were originat-
ed, accounting for 6.9% of mortgage originations.42 By 2006, the
34. The U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs expressed
this new mission in a report that accompanied S. 2733. S. REP. No. 102-282, at 34-35
(1992).
35. See Richard A. Epstein, The Government Takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac: Upending Capital Markets with Lax Business and Constitutional Standards, 10
N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 379, 386 (2014).
36. See McClendon, supra note 20, at 145-46.
37. Id. at 146.
38. See Peter J. Wallison & Edward J. Pinto, Free Fall: How Government Policies





41. Ronald D. Utt, The Subprime Mortgage Market Collapse: A Primer on the Causes
and Possible Solutions, BACKGROUNDER No. 2127, 2008, at 2-3, http://www.heritage.org/
researchlreports/2008/04/the-subprime-mortgage-market-collapse-a-primer-on-the-causes-
and-possible-solutions.
42. Dean Starkman, Power Problem, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (2009), http://www.cjr.
20161
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totals rose to $600 billion, which constituted 20% of mortgage
originations.43
While the OTD model enabled mortgage originators to issue
more mortgages by transferring the risk of borrower default, sev-
eral analysts have asserted that this lending approach also had
the negative effect of interfering with the lending institutions'
screening practices.44 Because mortgage originators did not have
to live with the consequences of bad lending decisions, their in-
centives to screen and monitor decreased.5 As a consequence,
lending institutions generated a large number of low-quality
mortgages on which borrowers later defaulted.46
For example, Benjamin Keys and his associates examined one
million home purchase loans from 2001 to 2006."7 To determine
whether securitization reduced the effectiveness of screening, the
authors used a rule of thumb of a FICO cutoff score of 620 for ac-
cepting loans.4" The authors found that the number of securitized
loans dramatically increased when the credit threshold moved
from 620- to 620+.41 Surprisingly, the authors also found that the
loans just above the FICO threshold defaulted at much higher
rates than their counterparts that fell just below." These findings
indicate that securitization practices negatively affect the screen-
ing incentives of lenders."
Amiyatosh Purnanandam also examined the relationship be-
tween securitization and screening by comparing the performance
of banks with large quantities of OTD loans to their counterparts
org/cover story/power problem.php?page=all&print=true.
43. Id.
44. See Benjamin J. Keys et al., Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence
from Subprime Loans, 125 Q. J. ECON. 307, 353-54 (2010); Amiyatosh Purnanandam,
Originate-to-Distribute Model and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 1881,
1912 (2011).
45. See Keys et al., supra note 44, at 308.
46. Purnanandam, supra note 44, at 1891.
47. Keys et al., supra note 44, at 310.
48. Id. FICO is a type of credit score that lenders use to evaluate a loan applicant's
credit risk. Persons with FICO scores below 620 have a difficult time obtaining funding at
a favorable rate. FICO Score, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.comlterms/f/fico
score.asp (last visited Feb. 19, 2016).
49. Keys et al., supra note 44, at 310 (finding that there were "more than twice as
many loans securitized above the credit threshold at 620+ than below the threshold at
620-").
50. Id. at 336.
51. Id. at 354-55.
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with low numbers of such loans prior to the first quarter of 2007,
the period right before the start of the subprime mortgage crisis.52
Purnanandam hypothesized that banks with heavy exposure to
the OTD market spent fewer resources on screening mortgages.53
The study found that high-OTD banks had significantly higher
default rates than low-OTD banks, which the author reasoned
was evidence that high-OTD loans were of lower quality.4
B. Charter Schools
Proponents of charter schools argue that this school choice op-
tion provides a "viable public alternative" for students stuck in
poor-performing urban school districts.55 According to the Nation-
al Alliance for Public Charter Schools, thousands of students in
urban districts are on waiting lists for charter schools, including
163,000 in New York City, 35,000 in Houston, and 25,700 in Bos-
ton.56 According to advocates of charter school expansion, a major
reason for charter school waiting lists is the lack of charter school
authorizing options.7 Charter school authorizers play a role simi-
lar to mortgage originators in that they decide whether to issue
charters.58 According to the National Association of Charter
School Authorizers ("NACSA"), there are six types of charter
school authorizers: (1) state education agencies; (2) local educa-
tion agencies ("LEAs"); (3) higher education institutions; (4) non-
profit organizations; (5) independent charter school boards; and
52. See Purnanandam, supra note 44, at 1883.
53. Id. at 1882.
54. Id. at 1912.
55. SUSAN PENDERGASS & NORA KERN, NAT'L ALL. FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS., WAITING
FOR THEIR CHANCE: A CLOSER LOOK AT WAIT LISTS IN URBAN PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS 3
(2015), http://www.publiccharters.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/waitlist-web.pdf.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, THE IMPORTANCE OF MULTIPLE AUTHORIZERS IN
CHARTER SCHOOL LAWS (2011), https://www.edreform.comwp-contentluploads/2012/05/
CERPrimerMultipleAuthorizersDec20ll.pdf ("States that do not have multiple authoriz-
ers create hostile environments for charters because school boards often view charter
schools as competition and reject applications not based on merit, but on politics."); HILL,
supra note 4, at 3 (recommending that "charter schools be allowed to choose among multi-
ple authorizers"); PENNCAN, supra note 4, at 4 ("Many states encourage quality charter
schools by permitting multiple authorizer choices, but Pennsylvania only allows local
school boards to do so. Studies show that strictly granting this power to school boards
leads to a lower-quality authorization process.").
58. See NAVL ASS'N OF CHARTER SCH. AUTHORIZERS, THE STATE OF CHARTER SCHOOL
AUTHORIZING 10 (2013), http://www.qualitycharters.org/research-policies/archive/state-of-
charter-authorizing/.
2016]
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(6) non-educational government entities.9 Most charter school au-
thorizers are LEAs. In 2013, they comprised 945 out of 1045, or
90% of authorizers." However, LEAs serve as the authorizer for
only a little more than half of all charter schools because most
LEA authorizers oversee five or fewer charter schools.61
Because of the reluctance of LEAs to issue a large number of
charters, supporters of charter school expansion have called for
states to increase the number of independent authorizers, such as
higher education institutions and nonprofit organizations, which
are not beholden to LEAs.62 According to the Center for Education
Reform, states with multiple charter school authorizers have
nearly three-and-one-half times as many charter schools as those
states that allow only LEA authorization.63 Audrye Wong has also
found that permissive laws, which include multiple authorizers,
are associated with an increase in charter schools.64
Supporters of charter school expansion claim that having mul-
tiple authorizers increases the number of charter schools by: (1)
serving as a "check," which prevents LEAs from developing cum-
bersome application processes; (2) providing charter schools with
an alternative in situations where the LEA is hostile toward
charter schools; and (3) attracting national providers who do not
wish to work with school district authorizers.65
However, the subprime mortgage saga suggests an alternate
reason why LEAs may be reluctant to authorize a high number of
charter schools. If a charter school authorized by an LEA is
closed, that LEA still has the duty to educate the children who
have been attending that charter school.66 It is easy to see how
absorbing dislocated students into the remaining traditional pub-
59. Id. at 3.
60. Id. at 4.
61. Id.
62. See CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, supra note 57; Travis Pillow, How Advocates Think
Florida Could Improve Its Charter School Law REDEFINED (Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.
redefinedonline.org/2015/01/floridas-charter-school-laws-get-better-marks-advocates/.
63. CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, supra note 57.
64. Audrye Wong, State Charter Law and Charter School Outcomes, 11 MICH. J. PUB.
AFF. 103, 115 (2014).
65. Joseph A. Giambrone, Note, Advancing the Charter School Movement in Illinois
Through Charter School Law: The Charter School Quality Law and Multiple Authorizers,
61 DEPAuL L. REV. 1213, 1227-28 (2012).
66. See Suzanne E. Eckes et al., Charter School Accountability: Legal Considerations
Concerning Nonrenewal and Revocation Procedures, 2006 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 551, 559.
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lic schools would cause logistical and financial hardships. Thus,
the hesitancy of LEAs to issue many charters may be due to con-
cerns similar to those of lending institutions under the traditional
originate-to-hold model of mortgage origination.
The subprime mortgage crisis also provides an explanation as
to why independent authorizers might be more likely to approve
charters than LEAs. In the case of charter school failure, inde-
pendent authorizers generally do not have the responsibility of
educating the children who have been displaced.67 Therefore, in-
dependent authorizers are in a position similar to OTD mortgage
originators in that they are freer to issue more charters because
they do not assume the risk of charter school failure.
Furthermore, similar to OTD loan origination, two studies have
found that the existence of multiple authorizers may have a nega-
tive impact on charter school screening practices. In the case of
charter school authorizers, insufficient screening was reflected in
poor academic performance. The first study, conducted by Stan-
ford University's Center for Research on Education Outcomes
("CREDO"), looked at charter school performance across fifteen
states and the District of Columbia on the National Assessment
of Educational Progress ("NAEP") tests.68 The CREDO study
found, inter alia, that states with multiple authorizers experi-
enced a significantly lower growth in academic learning in their
charter school students.9 According to CREDO, this finding indi-
cated that charter school operators were able to identify and
choose the least rigorous option to provide oversight."
Audrye Wong reached a similar conclusion in her study of the
impact of the state's legal environment on the academic perfor-
mance of charter school students. While Wong found that permis-
sive laws, which include multiple authorizers, were correlated
with an increase in charter schools, she also found that permis-
sive laws had a significantly negative correlation with academic
67. See Arianna Prothero, Charter Sector Is Confronting School Closures, EDUC. WK.,
Nov. 5, 2014, at 16 ("[R]egardless of how smoothly charter students make the transition to
new schools, the influx affects campuses on the receiving end, which are often regular dis-
trict schools.").
68. CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, MULTIPLE CHOICE: CHARTER SCHOOL
PERFORMANCE IN 16 STATES 1, 4-5 (2009), http://credo.stanford.edu/reports/MULTIPLE
_CHOICECREDO.pdf.
69. Id. at 40.
70. Id.
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outcomes as measured by NAEP performance.71 Wong posited
that independent authorizers have less rigorous standards than
LEAs, "who may be more demanding or even skeptical of charters
because charters directly affect the operations of their public
schools."72 Consequently, Wong reasoned, "[t]he availability of
multiple authorizers makes the approval process easier as appli-
cants can work outside the usual governmental bodies to find an
authorizer with less rigorous standards.73
Charter schools have also taken advantage of the availability of
multiple authorizers by engaging in "authorizer hopping.
'74 Au-
thorizer hopping occurs when a low-performing charter school
switches to a new authorizer to avoid accountability measures,
such as school closures.7' Authorizer hopping usually occurs in
one of two ways: (1) the charter school can pursue a contract with
a new authorizer once the school's existing charter has not been
renewed or has been revoked; or (2) the charter school can trans-
fer to a new authorizer during the term of the charter once it be-
comes clear that the present authorizer will revoke or not renew
the school's contract.6
II. THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM
A. Subprime Mortgages
Analysts have also argued that the OTD model helped to cause
the subprime mortgage crisis by altering the ways in which loans
were serviced." Mortgage servicing refers to the administration of
the mortgages and includes such activities as collecting payments
71. Wong, supra note 64, at 112,114.
72. Id. at 116.
73. Id.
74. DANIELA DOYLE, NAT'L ASS'N OF CHARTER SCH. AUTHORIZERS, AUTHORIZER
HOPPING: MOTIVATIONS, CAUSES, AND WAYS TO STOP IT 1 (2014), http://www.qualitychar
ters.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/PolicyBrief AuthorizerHopping.pdf.
75. Id. at 2.
76. Id.
77. Samuel Kruger, The Effect of Mortgage Securitization on Foreclosure and Modifi-
cation, McCOMBS 1 (2014), http://www.mccombs.utexas.edu/-/media/FilesfMSB/CenterslR
EFIC/2014%2OSummer%2OSymposiumlSecuritization%20and%2OForeclosurel.pdf; Adam
J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 11, 69-70 (2011)
(noting that the traditional mortgage lending relationship where a lender makes a loan
and services the loan itself has been replaced by a model where mortgages are financed




from mortgage borrowers and foreclosing mortgages that are in
default."8 Under the traditional originate-to-hold model, the lend-
ing institutions that originated the mortgage also serviced the
mortgage.79 By contrast, under the OTD model, securitization
trusts, which were passive for taxing purposes, owned the mort-
gages on behalf of investors.8" An industry of third-party mort-
gage servicers thus "emerged to service the[se] loans on behalf of
the securitization trusts."81
Mortgage servicing duties and compensation were established
in a pooling and servicing agreement.82 Compensation included
servicing fees, float income, a retained interest in the securitiza-
tion, and ancillary fees collected from mortgage borrowers.
Mortgage servicers derived a great deal of income from ancillary
fees, which are charges imposed on borrowers for reimbursement
for servicing activities, such as late payments, bounced checks,
and foreclosures.
8 4
There was a significant difference between how mortgage ser-
vicers addressed mortgage defaults under the traditional and
OTD models. Under the traditional model, if a loan defaulted,
then the lender took steps to maximize the value of the loan.85 Be-
cause traditional lenders had an undivided interest in the per-
formance of the mortgage, they fully internalized the costs and
benefits of decisions as to whether to restructure or foreclose on a
loan in default.86 By contrast, the compensation structure of OTD
mortgage servicing created a principal-agent problem between
mortgage investors and servicers. On the one hand, investors in
mortgage securities (principal) wished to maximize the values of
loans that are in default.87 On the other hand, mortgage servicers
(agent) did not have an interest in the performance of the loan
78. Levitin & Twomey, supra note 77, at 23.
79. Sarah Bloom Raskin, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech
at the National Consumer Law Center's Consumer Rights Litigation Conference: Prob-
lems in the Mortgage Servicing Industry 3-4 (Nov. 12, 2010), http://www.federalreserve.
gov/newsevents/speechfbloomraskin20101112a.pdf.
80. Id. at 4.
81. Id.
82. Levitin & Twomey, supra note 77, at 31.
83. Id. at 37.
84. Id. at 41-42.
85. Id. at 11.
86. Id.
87. Cf. id. at 71 (explaining that unlike investors, servicers have no interest in max-
imizing the value of loans in default).
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because their compensation is based on fees.88 Therefore, mort-
gage servicers, in direct conflict with their official mandate of
maximizing returns for investors, had more incentive to engage in
automated foreclosure instead of more expensive hands-on inter-
vention, which could reduce their compensation.9
Neither securitization trustees nor legal structures were suffi-
cient to successfully resolve this principal-agent problem during
the subprime mortgage crisis. Trustee monitoring was generally
passive.0 For instance, trustees waited for servicers' data report-
ing, but had "little obligation to analyze it."'" Also, trustees had
little incentive to fire servicers because they were required to
take the servicers' place if another servicer could not be found.92
Trustee monitoring was further compromised by the fact that
many trustees had conflicts of interest, such as close business re-
lationships with the servicers whom they were supposed to over-
93
see.
The failure to correct the principal-agent problem in mortgage
servicing exacerbated the subprime mortgage crisis because
mortgage servicers had the incentive to foreclose loans instead of
engaging in loss mitigation. Samuel Kruger estimated that "[t]he
bias of securitized loans towards foreclosure and away from modi-
fication" caused more than 500,000 of the 4.4 million foreclosures
that occurred "since the start of the financial crisis.94
B. Charter Schools
In the case of charter schools, private EMOs play a role similar
to mortgage servicers. Charter school governing boards, which
consist of appointed groups of private citizens, hire EMOs to
manage some or all of the day-to-day operations of charter
schools.9' Charter boards pay management fees to the EMOs, or
transfer the public funding to the EMOs, which then extract
88. Id.
89. See Kruger, supra note 77, at 25.
90. Levitin & Twomey, supra note 77, at 60.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 62.
94. Kruger, supra note 77, at 31.
95. See BRUCE BAKER & GARY MIRON, NAT'L EDUC. POLICY CTR., THE BUSINESS OF
CHARTER SCHOOLING: UNDERSTANDING THE POLICIES THAT CHARTER OPERATORS USE FOR
FINANCIAL BENEFIT 11-12 (2015), http://nepc.colorado.edu/publication/charter-revenue.
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management expenses." "EMOs can be for-profit or nonprofit.'
In 2014-15, it was estimated that approximately 100 for-profit
EMOs operated more than 900 charter and district schools, while
300 nonprofit EMOs ran more than 2000 charter schools.98 EMOs
now manage between 35-40% of all charter schools.99 Because
charter schools run by EMOs tend to have larger enrollments
than other types of charter schools, it is estimated that they edu-
cate 45% of the nation's charter school students.00
We believe that there is a principal-agent problem between
charter school boards and for-profit EMOs that is similar to the
one between securitization trusts and mortgage servicers. As a
result of the misalignment of incentives, for-profit EMOs have
sometimes acted in a manner that goes against the goals of the
charter school boards. Charter school boards have the responsibil-
ity, inter alia, to ensure that their schools follow all applicable
laws and that the schools spend public funds in a fiscally ac-
countable manner.'"' By contrast, for-profit EMOs have the incen-
tive to increase their revenues or cut expenses in ways that may
contradict the goals of charter school boards.
For example, by law, charter schools may not discriminate on
the basis of "gender, ethnicity, disability, class, or academic po-
tential."'0 2 Consequently, charter school boards serve as stewards
who ensure that charter schools are, in fact, enrolling all students
in a nondiscriminatory fashion.'°3 By contrast, for-profit EMOs
have the incentive to increase their revenues by not serving stu-
dents who are considered too "expensive," such as students with
severe disabilities. 4 The special education population of the
Chester Community Charter School, a Pennsylvania charter
school operated by a for-profit EMO charter school management
company, is illustrative. Pennsylvania charter schools receive
special education funding based on the average rate of special ed-
96. See id. at 12.
97. Id. at 7.
98. Id. at 8.
99. Id. at 7.
100. Id.
101. See 603 MASS. CODE REGS. § 1.06 (2015).
102. Matthew D. Bernstein, Whose Choice Are We Talking About: The Exclusion of
Students with Disabilities from For-Profit Online Charter Schools, 16 RICH. J.L. & PUB.
INT. 487, 495-96 (2013).
103. See id. at 495.
104. See BAKER & MIRON, supra note 95, at 19.
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ucation in the host district. The special needs population of the
host school district in 2008-09 consisted of 69% of students with
mild learning disabilities or speech impairments."5 By contrast,
the special education population for Chester Community Charter
School included 92% of students with mild learning disabilities or
speech impairments.1 6 By predominantly educating students with
mild disabilities while being reimbursed at the average cost for
special education, Chester Community Charter School enhanced
revenues and cut expenses by refusing to serve high-need special
education students.0 7
With respect to fiscal stewardship, charter school boards have
the responsibility to ensure that their schools spend market value
for the renting of facilities."' For-profit EMOs have sought o en-
hance their revenues by charging exorbitant fees for these ar-
rangements.1°9
For example, the Detroit Free Press reported that the National
Heritage Academies ("NHA") charged each of its fourteen schools
more than $1 million in rent per year."0 The Free Press review of
the 2012-13 audits of more than fifty other charter schools run by
other for-profit EMOs revealed that only seven charter schools
spent more than $500,000 in rent. By contrast, all but one of
NHA's schools spent more than $500,000 in rent."' The newspa-
per also reported that NHA collected $380 million in rent, includ-
ing nearly $42 million in 2013-14, since the company began run-
ning charter schools in 1995.112
Similar to the mortgage servicer situation, there is evidence to
suggest that the regulatory regime in place to guard against for-
profit EMO abuse does not address the principal-agent problem.




108. See MASS. DEP'T OF EDUC., CHARTER SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE AND GOVERNANCE
GUIDE 3 (2007), http://www.doe.mass.edu/charter/governance/adminguide.pdf.
109. See BAKER & MIRON, supra note 95, at 35 (providing an example of a leasing ar-
rangement in Missouri Charter schools).
110. Jennifer Dixon, Michigan's Biggest Charter Operator Charges Big Rents: 14







ing control over the EMOs; they select the EMOs to run the
school and can fire an EMO if the boards are dissatisfied with its
performance.' Yet, that is not always the case. In some instanc-
es, the EMOs have recruited individuals to serve on charter
school boards who then operated under the false impression that
the EMOs were in control of the school.
114
Even when boards try to exercise their duty to oversee their
EMOs, their authorizers may thwart them. Such was the case
with Detroit Free Enterprise Academy, serviced by NHA. While
the school was paying $1 million in rent to NHA, the school had
only thirty-three computers for 715 students."' After NHA re-
fused to divulge financial information, the board discussed the
possibility of hiring another management firm."1 6 However, the
Detroit Free Press reported that the school's authorizer, Grand
Valley State University, intervened on behalf of the private man-
agement firm, stating that if the board replaced NHA, the school
would lose its charter."7
III. THE PREDATORY PRACTICES PROBLEM
A. Subprime Mortgages
Another issue that has received considerable attention in rela-
tion to subprime mortgages is the practices used to entice bor-
rowers to enter into those agreements and enhance the potential
for profits. In fact, many have chronicled various "predatory"
practices used by mortgage originators."' A joint report by the
113. See BAKER& MIRON, supra note 95, at 39.
114. See id. at 39-40.
115. Jennifer Dixon, Board Members Say They Got No Support in Fight for Financial




118. See, e.g., Cheryl L. Wade, Fiduciary Duty and the Public Interest, 91 B.U. L. REV.
1191, 1191 (2011) (detailing the effects of corporate fiduciary duty breaches on local and
global communities); Cheryl L. Wade, How Predatory Mortgage Lending Changed African
American Communities and Families, 35 HAMLINE L. REV. 437, 437 (2012) (exploring the
effects of predatory mortgage lending on African American families); Alexander Bader,
Note, Truly Protecting the Consumer in Light of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: How Gen-
erally Applicable State Consumer Protection Laws Must Be a Key Tool in Keeping Lending
Institutions Honest, 25 J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 767, 769 (2011) (explaining that advocates
have called for a ban on subprime mortgage lending because it "created a market in which
predatory lending could flourish"); Nicole Lutes Fuentes, Comment, Defrauding the Amer.
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Department of the Treasury and HUD that pre-dated the finan-
cial crisis defined "predatory lending" as "engaging in deception
or fraud, manipulating the borrower through aggressive sales tac-
tics, or taking unfair advantage of a borrower's lack of under-
standing about loan terms."'19 The National Association of Con-
sumer Advocates noted that predatory practices occurred when "a
financial institution takes unfair advantage of a consumer's fi-
nancial needs by charging high interest rates and other uncon-
scionable fees and charges."'2 The group documented specific
types of predatory lending, including excessive fees, prepayment
penalties, kickbacks to brokers, "loan flipping" (refinancing of
loans to generate a fee collected by the lender), bundling unneces-
sary products with the loan, forced arbitration to restrict availa-
bility of legal remedies, steering individuals into risky loans when
they qualified for loans with better terms, and, specifically, tar-
geting vulnerable communities.2'
Research concerning predatory practices has demonstrated
that "[a]lthough financial institutions preyed on low income, el-
derly, and minority communities, their efforts were particularly
concentrated in communities of color."'22 One study found that
"African American borrowers were 6 to 34 percent more likely,
and Latino borrowers were 29 to 142 percent more likely to re-
ceive a higher rate subprime loan than similarly situated white
borrowers."'23 Targeting communities in this manner is referred




ican Dream: Predatory Lending in Latino Communities and Reform of California's Lend-
ing Law, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1279, 1279 (2009) (identifying the predatory practices of lend-
ing institutions in California, and its effect on the Latino community); Zainab A. Mehkeri,
Comment, Predatory Lending: What's Race Got to Do with It, 20 LoY. PUB. INT. L. REP. 44,
44 (2014) (finding that American homeowners paid the expense resulting from the fraudu-
lent tactics of lending institutions).
119. U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEv., HUD-TREASURY REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS
TO CURB PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 1 (2000), http://archives.hud.gov/reports/
treasrpt.pdf.
120. Payday, Title & Lending: Predatory Lending Practices, NAT'L ASS'N CONSUMER
ADVOCS., http://www.consumeradvocates.org/for-consumerspayday-title-lending.
121. Id.
122. Mehkeri, supra note 118, at 47.
123. Fuentes, supra note 118, at 1290-91 (citing DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOcIAN ET AL.,
CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, UNFAIR LENDING: THE EFFECT OF RACE AND ETHNICITY
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Several charter school critics have likewise begun to use the
term "predatory" to describe the actions of those trying to pro-
mote charter schools and particularly the profits of for-profit
management companies. They point to practices that prey on
vulnerable parents who lack the political power and financial re-
sources to advocate for change in the existing system. For exam-
ple, until years of pressure and publicity forced the school to drop
the policy,2' Noble Charter School in Chicago not only demanded
that its students conform to a strict discipline policy, but it also
fined students who violated the policy.'27 In another example of
taking advantage of vulnerable populations, some Milwaukee
charter schools provided gift cards and cash for parents who re-
ferred other families to the school.2 ' This prompted the Milwau-
kee Common Council to pass an ordinance prohibiting the prac-
tice in 2014.129 A Louisiana commentator considers practices used
by charter schools to limit the number of low performing and spe-
125. See, e.g., Nina M. Flores, As a Teacher, I Fought Predatory For-Profit Schools from
the Inside, WASH. POST (July 23, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverythi
ng/wp/2014107/23/as-a-teacher-i-fought-predatory-for-profit-schools-from-the-insideI ('The
realization was uncomfortable: I was a part of a business relying on the exploitation of col-
lege dreams for money."); Shaun Johnson, At the Chalk Face: Saving a School: Predatory
Enrollment, NATL EDUC. POLY CTR. (July 10, 2014), http://nepc.colorado.edu/blog/saving-
school-predatory-enrollment (finding that charter school enrollment systems are "pitting
one section of low-income communities against another"); Bertha Lewis, "Success"? Preda-
tory Education and Subprime Schools, BLACK STAR NEWS (Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.
blackstarnews.com/education/education/success -predatory-education-and-subprimeschool
s.html (describing the practices of New York City's Success Academies charter schools as
"predatory").
126. Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah, Charter School Drops Controversial Discipline Fee, CHI.
TRIB. (Apr. 11, 2014), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-04-11/news/chi-charter-scho
ol-drops-controversial-discipline-fee-2014041 1_1charter-school-noble-network-student-dis
cipline.
127. Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah, Chicago's Noble Charter School Network Has Tough Dis-
cipline Policy, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 7, 2014), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-04-07/
news/ct-charter-noble-discipline-met-20140407 1_noble- students-charter-chicago-public-
schools (reporting that one student was fined $500 for disciplinary infractions).
128. Erin Richards, Crude or Shrewd? School Offers Cash for Student Referrals,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.jsonline.comlnews/educationlcrude-or-
shrewd-school-offers-cash-for-student-referrals-b99346916z1-274427341. html
129. The ordinance reads: "No charter school shall offer money or any other thing of
pecuniary value to a parent, student, teacher, staff member or any other person as an in-
centive for recruiting a student to enroll at a charter school." MILWAUKEE, WIS., REV.
CODE OF ORDINANCES § 330-26 (2015); see also Erin Richards, Milwaukee Ordinances
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cial needs students from enrolling to be examples of predatory
behavior.3 '
Reverse redlining, too, has analogous practices associated with
charter schools. As explained by one commentator in relation to
New York's charter schools:
New York state government has "redlined" poor school districts for
decades, shortchanging them billions even after New York State's
highest court ordered it to make restitution. But instead of granting
communities of color the "credit" needed to educate children in public
school, the predatory equity crowd swooped in with a new option
they said would work for us-just like they did with subprime
loans. ... If we allow these same bad actors to continue down the
path of expanding charter schools and privatizing public education,
then we're placing the future of our children in the hands of
predators ....
Policies that take low performing schools--often located in ur-
ban areas-and convert them to charter schools can also be
viewed as reverse redlining.'3' Similarly, policies known as parent
trigger laws, which permit the conversion of a public school into a
charter school when a sufficient number of parents sign a petition
to do so, may be a form of reverse redlining. For example, indi-
viduals promoting the conversion of one California school under
the state's parent trigger law reportedly engaged in predatory
practices that preyed on the poor, largely immigrant population
served by the school:
[A] Los Angeles-based group calling itself Parent Revolution orga-
nized a local campaign to harass and trick [the parents] into signing
petitions that they thought were meant for simple school improve-
130. Michael Deshotels, The Great Predatory Charter School Ripoff, LA. EDUCATOR
(Sept. 1, 2015), http://louisianaeducator.blogspot.com/2015/09/the-great-predatory-charter-
school.html (listing "predatory" practices such as "location of their school in a more afflu-
ent neighborhood, not providing transportation to students, counseling out low performers
or other undesirables, [and] 'no excuses' discipline policies that dump low performers back
to the real public schools").
131. Bertha Lewis, Predatory Equity Leads to Subprime Schools, HUFFINGTON POST
(June 1, 2015, 5:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.comfbertha-lewis/predatory-equity-lea
ds-to-subprime-schools b_6986396.html.
132. See Terence Courtney, Predation on Public Education, BLACK ALLIANCE FOR JUST
IMMIGR. (July 1, 2014), http://blackalliance.org/predation-on-public-education/; Amy
Frogge & Jill Speering, ASD Riles Parents, Community with School Takeover,
TENNESSEAN (Dec. 22, 2014, 11:06 AM), http://www.tennessean.com/story/opinion/contri
butors/2014/12/22/asd-riles-parents-community-school-takeover/20648199/; Ingrid Walker
Henry et al., Why We Oppose the Takeover of Milwaukee's Public Schools, MILWAUKEE J.




ments. In fact those petitions turned out to be part of a sophisticated
campaign to convert their children's public school into a privately-
run charter-something a majority of parents opposed. At times, lo-
cals say, the Parent Revolution volunteers' tactics were so heavy-
handed in gathering signatures that they crossed the line into har-
assment and intimidation. Many parents were misled about what
the petition they signed actually meant. Some told me that the in-
timidation with some of the undocumented Latino residents included
bribery and extortion. 133
IV. WHAT WOULD A CHARTER SCHOOL "BUBBLE" LOOK LIKE?
In this section, we sketch out how a "bubble" would be mani-
fested in the charter school sector. In taking on this task, we real-
ize that the framework used for "economic bubbles," such as the
subprime mortgage crisis, does not work for governmental poli-
cies, such as charter schools. According to the economic approach,
a bubble is defined "as any asset or commodity whose price differs
from the 'fundamental' value of the asset/commodity."'' 4 This
framework is unhelpful for the analysis of governmental policies
because, inter alia, "[i]t is impossible to assign a value to a policy
,,135
To determine how governmental policies become bubbles, re-
searchers have developed the concept of a "policy bubble." Accord-
ing to Moshe Maor, a policy bubble is defined as "a real and/or
perceived policy overreaction that is reinforced by positive feed-
back over a long period of time."'36 Maor defines a "policy overre-
action" as a "policy that imposes objective and/or perceived social
costs without producing offsetting objective and/or perceived ben-
efits."
137
Maor identifies three phases for a policy bubble: birth, maturi-
ty, and death.13' A policy bubble may form when the emotional
idea of a policy corresponds with the mood of a target popula-
133. Yasha Levine, Pulling the Parent Trigger: The Push to Privatize Public Schools,
TRUTHOUT (May 10, 2013, 10:31 AM), http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/16300-pulling-
the-trigger.
134. Maor, supra note 18, at 472.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 470.
137. Id.
138. Moshe Maor, Policy Bubbles: What Factors Drive Their Birth, Maturity and
Death?, LONDON SCH. ECON. & POL. Sci., http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/policy-
bubbles/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2016).
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tion.'39 A policy may grow and mature due to positive feedback,
which can come in the form of "herding."'14 Herding occurs when
individuals in target groups make choices based on the decisions
of other persons in their group.' As a result of these similar
choices, the service or public good becomes more available in the
locality. Eventually, the policy feedback may have a lock-in effect
whereby "the policy becomes institutionalized and grows due to
self-reinforcement."'4 Finally, a bubble may burst when negative
feedback replaces positive feedback.'43 When a bubble does burst,
individuals and governmental entities can experience severe loss-
es, occasionally even endangering the sustainability of the policy
system.
44
Applying the policy bubble framework developed by Maor, we
conclude that charter school policy bubbles might form in urban
African American communities. Polls have consistently found
that African American families are very supportive of charter
schools.4' Because of their dissatisfaction with traditional public
schools, many African American parents want alternative educa-
tional options. 6 Therefore, they may support "permissive" poli-
cies associated with charter school growth, such as the imposition
of multiple authorizers, the removal of charter school caps, and
the participation of EMOs, despite Audrye Wong's finding that
these conditions have a significant negative correlation with aca-
demic performance.'7
Policy bubbles may grow in urban African American communi-
ties due to the "herding" phenomenon, which may come in the
form of charter school waiting lists. As families hear more about
these waiting lists, they may conclude that charter schools are
the best means for them to obtain better educational opportuni-
139. See Maor, supra note 18, at 475.
140. Id. at 477.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 478.
143. Id. at 479.
144. Id.
145. BLACK ALL. FOR EDUC. OPTIONS, A SURVEY REPORT ON EDUCATION REFORM,
CHARTER SCHOOLS, AND THE DESIRE FOR PARENTAL CHOICE IN THE BLACK COMMUNITY 10
(2013), http://scoter.baeo.org/news multimedia/20130723-Survey%2OReport-NEW%5B9%
5D.pdf; New Survey Shows Black Voters Strongly Support Parental Choice for Educational
Options in Their Communities, BLACK ALL. FOR EDUC. OPTIONS, http://www.baeo.org?ns
_ref=ll&id=7335 [hereinafter New Survey] (last visited Feb. 19, 2016).
146. New Survey, supra note 145.
147. Wong, supra note 64, at 116.
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ties for their children. Finally, these policy bubbles could burst as
families hear more negative news about the academic perfor-
mance of charter schools, the inequitable discipline of certain
student populations, as well as expos6s about financial fraud and
the refusal to educate certain types of students on the part of
EMOs. There could be a great deal of damage as parents of stu-
dents attending these charter schools mount legal challenges al-
leging that the education their children are receiving violates civil
rights guarantees.'
V. WHAT CAN GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES DO TO AVERT A
CHARTER SCHOOL BUBBLE?
State and federal governmental entities can take several steps
to avoid the same mistakes in the charter school context that led
to the subprime mortgage crisis. If state legislatures decide to
empower multiple authorizers, they should enact several provi-
sions in their charter school statutes to ensure effective screening
of charter schools. NACSA has proposed several measures that
legislatures could adopt to prevent forum shopping and authoriz-
er hopping, such as: (1) consistent frameworks for measuring
charter school performance; (2) consistently high renewal stand-
ards that prevent charter schools from hopping to other authoriz-
ers once they are threatened with closure; (3) evaluations for pro-
spective authorizers, as well as periodic evaluations of current
authorizers; and (4) sanctions for authorizers that have exercised
148. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Harris, Lawsuit Accuses Brooklyn Charter School of Failing
to Provide Special Education Services, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2015), http:/www.nytimes.com/
2015/11/06/nyregion/lawsuit-accuses-brooklyn-charter-school-of-failing-to-provide-special-
education-services.html (identifying a suit filed against the Achievement First Crown
Heights charter school for systematically failing "to provide [five students] a free appro-
priate public education in violation of their rights"); Press Release, Hilary Hammell, Char-
ter Schools Break Law and Exclude Vulnerable Students with Illegal Practice, Civil
Rights Group Claims (Nov. 19, 2014), http://publicadvocates.org/press-releaseslcharter-
schools-break-law-and-exclude-vulnerable-students-with-illegal-practice-civil (reporting
the release of a year-long investigation into the inequitable and illegal practices of some
California charter schools); Andrew Vanacore, N.O. School Officials Reach Settlement in
Special Education Lawsuit; Monitor to Oversee Reforms, THE ADVOC. (Dec. 19, 2014, 6:42
PM), http://theadvocate.com/features/healthandfitness/1 1 37054-123/no-school-officials-re
ach-settlement (describing a suit filed against New Orleans charter schools for failing to
enroll students with disabilities, and failing to provide federally required services for en-
rolled special needs students).
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low standards or have shown a willingness to enable authorizer
hopping.49
To protect against the principal-agent problem, state legisla-
tures should prohibit any person with a financial relationship
with an EMO that is serving a charter school from holding a posi-
tion on that charter school's governing board."' Legislatures
should also require training for board members on the best prac-
tices for effective governance of charter schools."' Charter school
legislation should further require authorizers to scrutinize the
lease and management agreements between charter school
boards and EMOs."' Contracts for management services should
be made available to the public with detailed information about
the services EMOs provide.' Moreover, authorizers should re-
quire EMOs to provide full financial disclosure of the expendi-
tures and profits related to each school that they serve."' In addi-
tion, to guard against predatory charter school practices,
authorizers should prohibit practices that take advantage of vul-
nerable populations, such as fining parents for discipline infrac-
tions and prohibiting low-performing and special needs students
from enrolling in charter schools.155
Finally, the federal government must use its funding incentive
programs to encourage high-quality authorization standards. Ac-
cording to the Center for Media and Democracy, the federal gov-
ernment has spent more than $3.3 billion since 1995 to promote
charter school expansion.5 6 However, a review of the documenta-
149. NAT'L ASS'N OF CHARTER SCH. AUTHORIZERS, ON THE ROAD TO BETTER
ACCOUNTABILITY: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE CHARTER SCHOOL POLICIES 59 (2015), http://
www.qualitycharters.orgwp-content/uploads/2015/08/State-Policy-Analysis.pdf.
150. LEIGH DINGERSON, ANNENBERG INST. FOR SCH. REFORM, PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY
FOR CHARTER SCHOOLS: STANDARDS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EFFECTIVE
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tion surrounding these funding efforts revealed that the U.S. De-
partment of Education has "knowingly awarded grants to states
with no statutory oversight over charter authorizers and schools
as the grant applications are evaluated based on how much 'flexi-
bility' from state laws charter schools have."'57
In September 2015, the U.S. Department of Education contin-
ued this trend with its $157 million grant program designed to
replicate and expand high-quality charter schools."5 8 The agency
awarded $71 million to the Ohio Department of Education
("ODE"), even though the state's charter schools had become a
"joke" due to the sector's myriad scandals.1 9 The state's authoriz-
er system, which allowed higher education institutions and non-
profit entities to serve as authorizers, also received its share of
criticism. NACSA reported that several authorizers had sold
management services amounting to "tens of thousands of dollars
each year" to their schools, and that several schools that one au-
thorizer had closed were able to re-open as "new" schools under
other authorizers (i.e., "authorizer hopping"). 6' Moreover, the
state's effort to reform its charter school authorizing system,
which created a ranking system of charter school authorizers,
was criticized for failing to penalize authorizers for the poor aca-
demic performance of their schools.' In light of this disparage-
ment, the U.S. Department of Education in November 2015 re-
quested additional information from ODE about its charter
authorization system in order to receive the grant award.12 ODE
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was required to provide in its response: (1) "[a]ny additional sys-
tems to ensure the integrity of charter school and charter school
authorizer data and evaluations"; and (2) "[a]ny additional report-
ing procedures that will facilitate a transparent charter school
authorizer and charter school review process."6' We hope that the
federal government continues down this path by including au-
thorizer accountability criteria as a condition for charter school
funding in the future.
CONCLUSION
As state and federal policymakers ponder over the wisdom of
increasing the number of charter schools, they should pay atten-
tion to the lessons of the subprime mortgage crisis. According to
several analysts, the creation of an alternate granting structure
helped to create that debacle by removing the risk of mortgage
default, while also removing the incentive to conduct careful
screenings of mortgages. The alternate granting structure also
created a principal-agent problem between mortgage investors
and servicers that the legal structures were poorly equipped to
counter. Finally, many charter schools are engaging in predatory
practices that are similar to the subprime mortgage crisis. We
fear that charter school advocates may be inadvertently making
the same mistakes in their attempts to create more charter
schools. If state and federal policymakers are not careful, they
could create a charter school bubble in urban African American
communities that could eventually burst. Therefore, policymakers
should put safeguards in place to prevent this undesirable event
from occurring.
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